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Abstract 
This study investigates how enhancing gender inclusion affects inequality in 42 African 
countries for the period 2004-2014. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalized Method 
of Moments. Three inequality indicators are used, namely, the: Gini coefficient, Atkinson index, 
and Palma ratio. The two gender inclusion measurements used include female labour force 
participation and female employment. The following main findings are established. There are 
positive net effects on inequality from the enhancement of gender inclusion dynamics. An 
extended threshold analysis is used to assess critical masses at which further increasing gender 
inclusion enhances inequality. The established thresholds are: (i) 55.555 “employment to 
population ratio, 15+, female (%)”for the nexus with the Gini coefficient. (ii) 50 “labor force 
participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)” and between 50 to 55 
“employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%)”, for the Atkinson index. (iii) 61.87 “labor 
force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)” for the Palma ratio. These 
established thresholds are worthwhile for sustainable development because, beyond the critical 
masses, policy makers should complement the gender inclusion policy with other measures 
designed to reduce income inequality. Some complementary measures that can be taken on board 
beyond the established thresholds could focus on enhancing, inter alia: information and 
communication technology, infrastructural development; financial inclusion and inclusive 
education.  
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1. Introduction 
It is worthwhile to involve women in the formal economic sector because according to Abney 
and Laya (2018), such involvement could increase global annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
by approximately 28 trillion USD by 2025. The author maintains that there are a plethora of 
rewards that are associated with enhanced gender equality in formal sector economic activities. 
They include: poverty reduction; environmental sustainability; consumer choice; and innovation. 
Compared to other regions in the world, in Africa, the concern of gender exclusion is particularly 
important because the continent is characterised by the lowest level of female economic 
participation in the formal economic sector (Efobi, Tanankem & Asongu, 2018). The focus of 
this research on assessing how enhancing female economic participation affects inequality in 
Africa is motivated by three main factors, namely: (i) the low gender inclusion in the formal 
economic sector3; (ii) the perilous character of inequality in the post-2015 agenda of sustainable 
development goals (SDGs and (iii) gaps in the literature. These factors are expanded in the 
passages that follow.   
 First, contemporary development literature is broadly consistent on the position that 
women in Africa are largely relegated to secondary and peripheral activities (Efobi et al., 2018; 
Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018a). Such activities include: unpaid domestic activities;petty 
trading;and small holding farming. The narrative is in line with the scholarly and policy literature 
on gender inclusion in the formal economic sector (Ellis, Blackden, Cutura, MacCulloch & 
Seebens, 2007; FAO, 2011; Tandon & Wegerif, 2013). Moreover, according to the World Bank 
(2015) and the International Labour Organisation (2013), the non-involvement of women in the 
formal economic sector represents an issue that should be addressed in order for countries to 
enjoy substantial benefits from shared economic prosperity. According to these multilateral 
institutions of development, the fragile and meager externalities of welfare that is linked to 
economic growth are partly traceable to gender exclusion from formal economic projects. The 
account is supported by Hazel (2010), who maintains that the highest poverty rate among 
females in the world is in Africa. Furthermore, Efobi et al. (2018) argue that engaging more 
women in formal economic activities will improve socio-economic development on a multitude 
of fronts, inter alia: reduce poverty, ameliorate labour market structural transformation and 
                                                          
3 The terms “female economic participation”, “gender inclusion” and “gender economic participation” are used 
interchangeably throughout the study.  
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augment female gender welfare. The contemporary importance of these benefits is even more 
worthwhile because of the inclusive development issues in the achievement of SDGs.  
 Second, inclusive development is a central theme to the achievement of SDGs in Africa 
for at least two main reasons: (i) it increases the negative responsiveness of poverty to economic 
growth and (ii) most African countries did not achieve the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) extreme poverty target because of inequality (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Asongu 
& le Roux, 2019; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019). The latter is essentially 
because the responsiveness of poverty to economic growth decreases with growing levels of 
inequality (Fosu, 2015;Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2018). It follows from this account that 
reducing gender inequality will enhance the negative incidence of economic growth on poverty. 
The challenge of reducing extreme poverty to a threshold of below 3% by 2030 cannot feasibly 
be achieved unless inequality is substantially curtailed in order to enhance shared prosperity 
(Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a, 2020). This concern is supported by the findings of Bicaba, 
Brixiova and Ncube (2017): “This paper examines its feasibility for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
the world’s poorest but growing region. It finds that under plausible assumptions extreme 
poverty will not be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can be reduced to low levels through high 
growth and income redistribution towards the poor segments of the society” (p. 93). According 
to Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2014), the reference to SSA extends to North Africa. This 
study focuses on the relevance of enhancing gender equality in income inequality because of an 
apparent gap in the literature.  
 Third, to the best of our knowledge, the contemporary literature on gender inclusion has 
focused on, inter alia: the nexus between financial inclusion and mobile money in SSA with a 
moderating role of gender and social networks (Bongomin, Ntayi, Munene & Malinga, 2018); 
the participation of rural women in information technology programmes for agricultural 
development (Uduji& Okolo-Obasi, 2018, 2019a, 2019b;Uduji, Okolo-Obasi& Asongu, 2019); 
gender gap prevalence in financial inclusion (Kairiza, Kiprono & Magadzire, 2017);  the 
importance of gender in science education (Elu, 2018); a model for the analysis of gender within 
the informal and financial productive sectors (Bayraktar & Fofack, 2018); the nexus between 
gender inequality and access to microfinance (Mannah-Blankson, 2018); the importance of 
gender in sustainable agricultural production (Theriault, Smale & Haider, 2017) and the role of 
ICT in gender inclusion (Efobi et al., 2018).  
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 The study in the literature closest to this research is Efobi et al. (2018). The paper has 
assessed how the advancement in ICT has affected the participation of women in the formal 
economic sector using data from 42 African countries for the period 1990-2014. 
Employingordinary least squares, fixed effects and generalized method of moments regressions, 
the study has concluded that ICT increases women’s participation in the formal economic sector 
in the following order to increasing magnitude: mobile phone penetration, internet penetration 
and fixed broadband subscriptions. We extend the study by: (i) employing the outcome variable 
(i.e. gender inclusion) as in independent variable of interest in this study and (ii) using three 
inequality dynamics as proxies for the outcome variable (i.e. the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson 
index and the Palma ratio). Furthermore, we do not stop at providing scholars and policy makers 
with direct linkages between the investigated economic phenomena. Accordingly, we go a step 
further by providing actionable policy thresholds at which enhancing female economic 
participation affects inequality. Hence, by providing such policy thresholds, we argue that it is 
not enough to simply provide linkages between macroeconomic variables from empirical 
analyses. Going a step further and disclosing specific policy thresholds is more actionable and 
relevant to policy makers.   
The research question being studied is the following:how does enhancing female 
economic participation affect inequality in Africa? Attempting to answer this question is framed 
within the context of applied economics. Hence, the study builds on the premise that increasing 
the participation of women in the formal economic sector should logically have an incidence on 
income inequality in the light of the narratives from the above paragraphs that, women are 
among the poorest fractions of society in Africa. Thus, this study observes that applied 
econometrics should not exclusively be acknowledged in the light of accepting or rejecting 
existing theoretical frameworks. Accordingly, the research argues that a study framed on logical 
intuition is a useful scientific activity that can inform theory-building.   
 The positioning of this study also departs from contemporary sustainable development 
literature which has focused on inter alia: linkages between environmental performance of 
nation states, income inequality and income (Morse, 2018); voluntary sustainability standards 
(Bennett, 2018); trends and future tendencies of sustainable development (Wichaisri & 
Sopadang, 2018); challenges to sustainable development (Fearnside, 2018) and nexuses between 
movements, mining and sustainable development (Bebbington&Bebbington, 2018;Bainton, 
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Owen & Kemp, 2018). The rest of the study is structured as follows. The data and methodology 
are covered in section 2, while the empirical results are disclosed in section 3. Section 4 
concludes with implications and future directions.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
This study focuses on forty-two African countries with annual data from 2004 to 20144. The 
number of sampled countries and periodicity are motivated by constraints in data availability at 
the time of the study. The data is obtained from various sources, notably: (i) the Global 
Consumption and Income Project (GCIP) for the inequality variables (i.e. the Gini coefficient, 
the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio); (ii) the International Labor Organization for the 
variables on female economic participation (i.e. female labor force participation and female 
employment); (iii) the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank for a control variable 
(i.e. remittances) and (iv) the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank 
for two control variables (i.e. remittances and financial stability).  
 The three inequality indicators are consistent with recent income inequality literature in 
Africa (Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019b) while the adopted gender 
inclusion variables are also in accordance with recent literature on the participation of women in 
the formal economic sector (Efobi et al., 2018). The three control variables are also motivated by 
recent inclusive human development and income inequality literature (Anyanwu, 2011; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018b; Meniago & Asongu, 2018). Indicators in 
the conditioning information set are limited to three; in order to avoid concerns about instrument 
proliferation in post-estimation diagnostics tests that could substantially bias the estimated 
coefficients. Such restriction of elements in the conditioning information set is not uncommon 
because studies in the empirical literature based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
have used less than three control variables (Bruno, De Bonis & Silvestrini, 2012). In some cases, 
no control variables are involved (Osabuohien & Efobi, 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017). It 
what follows we discuss the expected signs of the control variables.  
                                                          
4The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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 First, the importance of political stability is predicted to be positive because it avails a 
promising environment for investment and entrepreneurship opportunities. Such opportunities 
increase social mobility and reduce unemployment, which, by extension, can promote the 
participation of women in the formal economic sector. Second, in accordance with recent 
inclusive development literature (Anyanwu, 2011; Meniago & Asongu, 2018), remittances 
increase inequality in Africa because most of those migrating abroad are from wealthier fractions 
of the population. This explanation can be extended to gender exclusion. Third, the incidence of 
financial stability depends on market dynamics, and the expected signs cannot be established a 
priori. What is important to note is that financial stability affects gender inclusion. The 
definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1, whereas the summary statistics 
is disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is covered in Appendix 3.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 GMM: Specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
This research is consistent with recent literature which has adopted the Generalised Method 
Moments as estimation strategy for four main reasons (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; 
Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a). First, the number of cross sections is 
considerably higher than the corresponding number of periods in each cross section. 
Accordingly, N (or 42 countries)>T(2004-2014 or 11 years). Second, the adopted two indicators 
of gender inclusion are persistent in the light of the fact that the correlations between their level 
and first lag values are higher than 0.800, which is the rule of thumb for establishing persistence 
in a variable (Tchamyou, 2019b). Accordingly, the underlying correlations from the female labor 
force participation rate and the female employment rate are respectively, 0.999 and 0.998. Third, 
in the light of the panel data structure of this study, cross-country variations are considered in the 
estimation processes. Fourth, the issue of endogeneity is addressed because, on the one hand, 
there is control for the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time-invariant omitted variables and 
on the other, reverses causality or simultaneity is addressed through a process of instrumentation.  
               The GMM technique adopted in this study is the Arellano and Bover (1995) 
improvement by Roodman (2009a, 2009b) which has been documented in the attendant literature 
to reduce the proliferation of instruments (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Boateng et al., 2018).  
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The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiI , is an inequality indicator (i.e. the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma 
ratio) of  country i in  period t , 0 is a constant, F  entails gender inclusion (female labour force 
participation and female employment), FF  denotes quadratic interactions between gender 
inclusion indicators (“female labour force participation” × “female labour force participation” 
and “female employment” × “female employment”),   W  is the vector of control variables 
(political stability, remittances and financial stability), represents the coefficient of auto-
regression which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is enough to 
capture past information, t is the time-specific constant, i is the country-specific effect and ti ,  
the error term.  
 
2.2.2Identification and exclusion restrictions 
 
              The strategies of identification and exclusion restrictions are consistent with recent 
literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019). These strategies are indispensable for a robust GMM specification. In 
line with the corresponding literature, “years” are acknowledged as variables that are strictly 
exogenous, and gender inclusion variables are assumed to be predetermined or endogenous 
explaining. In other words, the identified strictly exogenous variables are presumed to affect the 
inequality outcomes variables exclusively through the endogenous explaining mechanisms of 
gender inclusion. This approach is not very different from the arguments of Roodman (2009b), 
which maintain that it is not very feasible for time-invariant indicators to be endogenous upon a 
first difference5.   
                                                          
5Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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In light of the above, the criterion for assessing the validity of the identification strategy is the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. The null hypothesis of this 
test is the position that the instruments affect the outcome variable exclusively via the 
predetermined variables or endogenous explaining channels. Hence, the null hypothesis of the 
DHT findings that are reported in the next section should not be rejected in order for the 
exclusion restriction assumption to hold. The criterion for exclusion restriction is consistent with 
the standard instrumental variable (IV) framework which requires that the alternative hypothesis 
of the Sargan overidentifying restrictions test should be rejected in order for the instruments not 
to affect the outcome variable beyond the proposed mechanisms or exogenous explaining 
channels (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt& Levine, 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d). 
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Presentation of results  
The findings are presented in Tables 1 to 3 in this section. Accordingly, Table 1, Table 2 and 
Table 3, respectively, focus on the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Palma ratio. Each 
table has two main specifications corresponding to the two main independent variables of 
interest, namely: female labor force participation and female employment.  For each category of 
specifications, two sub-specifications are apparent, notably: one without a conditioning 
information set and another with a conditioning information set. It is worthwhile to note that, in 
the light of the narrative in the data section (on empirical studies with GMM models that have 
been based on no control variable or less than three control variables), the specifications with 
and without the conditioning information set are valid for the interpretation of results and 
corresponding concluding implications.   
               Four information criteria are used to assess the post-estimation validity of results6. In 
the light of these criteria, the second specification of Table 1 is not valid because the null 
hypothesis of the Hansen test is rejected. This research places more emphasis on the Hansen test 
vis-à-vis the Sargan test because the former is more robust, though affected by the concern of 
instrument proliferation. Accordingly, the Sargan test, while not robust, is not affected by 
                                                          
6 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation 
in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant 
because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR 
test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or 
limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, 
the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu& De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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concerns of instrument proliferation. A way of addressing the conflicting criteria is to adopt the 
robust test (i.e. the Hansen) and then ensure that the drawback corresponding to the adopted test 
(i.e. the concern of instrument proliferation) is addressed by ensuring that for each specification, 
the number of cross sections is higher than the corresponding number of instruments.  
Table 1: Gender inclusion and the Gini coefficient  
   
 Dependent variable: the Gini coefficient 
 Female Labor Force participation 
(FLFpart) 
Female Employment (FE) 
     
Gini coefficient (-1) 0.912*** 0.924*** 0.896*** 0.996*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FLFpart -0.00003 0.0007 --- --- 
 (0.976) (0.400)   
FLFpart × FLFpart 0.000001 -0.000004 --- --- 
 (0.897) (0.400)   
FE --- --- -0.010** 0.0007 
   (0.017) (0.172) 
FE×FE --- --- 0.00009** -0.000006 
   (0.013) (0.201) 
Political Stability  --- 0.0001 --- 0.0008 
  (0.866)  (0.541) 
Remittances  --- 0.00002 --- -0.00001 
  (0.762)  (0.809) 
Financial Stability  --- 0.0003*** --- 0.0005*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  na na 0.010 na 
Thresholds  na na 55.555 na 
AR(1) (0.093) (0.096) (0.107) (0.097) 
AR(2) (0.398) (0.258) (0.213) (0.289) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.002) (0.009) (0.050) 
Hansen OIR (0.071) (0.682) (0.181) (0.518) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group --- (0.158) --- (0.088) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.094) (0.883) (0.901) (0.834) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group --- (0.331) --- (0.305) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.808) --- (0.627) 
     
Fisher  1119.73*** 187244.51*** 4034.11*** 223392.95*** 
Instruments  20 32 20 32 
Countries  41 38 39 36 
Observations  409 325 389 307 
     
11 
 
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. FLFpart: Female Labor Force Participation. FE: Female Employment. 130.03, 113.19 are mean 
values for respectively, female labor force participation, and female employment. Constants are included in the regressions. n.a: not applicable 
because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant.  
 
 
Table 2: Gender inclusion and the Atkinson index 
     
 Dependent variable: the Atkinson index  
 Female Labor Force participation 
(FLFpart) 
Female Employment (FE) 
     
Atkinson index (-1) 0.953*** 0.940*** 0.958*** 0.946*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FLFpart -0.005*** -0.002 --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.111)   
FLFpart × FLFpart 0.00005*** 0.00002** --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.060)   
FE --- --- -0.011** -0.005* 
   (0.011) (0.051) 
FE×FE --- --- 0.0001*** 0.00005** 
   (0.008) (0.035) 
Political Stability  --- 0.003 --- 0.003 
  (0.414)  (0.463) 
Remittances  --- 0.0008 --- 0.0004 
  (0.127)  (0.385) 
Financial Stability  --- 0.001*** --- 0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.006) 
     
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  0.0080 na 0.0116 0.0063 
Thresholds  50 na 55 50 
     
AR(1) (0.077) (0.086) (0.074) (0.076) 
AR(2) (0.436) (0.573) (0.287) (0.190) 
Sargan OIR (0.186) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.107) (0.308) (0.426) (0.671) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group --- (0.245) --- (0.268) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.192) (0.369) (0.880) (0.779) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group --- (0.316) --- (0.468) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.336) --- (0.679) 
     
Fisher  378.25*** 1673.93*** 77.88*** 2000.74*** 
Instruments  20 32 20 32 
Countries  41 38 39 36 
Observations  409 325 389 307 
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***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. FLFpart: Female Labor Force Participation. FE: Female Employment. 130.03, 113.19 are mean 
values for respectively, female labor force participation, and female employment. Constants are included in the regressions. Constants are 
included in the regressions. n.a: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not 
significant.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Gender inclusion and the Palma ratio 
   
 Dependent variable: the Palma ratio  
 Female Labor Force participation 
(FLFpart) 
Female Employment (FE) 
     
The Palma ratio (-1) 0.988*** 1.003*** 1.010*** 1.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FLFpart -0.099*** -0.036 --- --- 
 (0.003) (0.156)   
FLFpart × FLFpart 0.0008*** 0.0003 --- --- 
 (0.002) (0.114)   
FE --- --- -0.172 -0.041 
   (0.178) (0.187) 
FE×FE --- --- 0.001 0.0003 
   (0.147) (0.146) 
Political Stability  --- -0.0007 --- -0.011 
  (0.989)  (0.789) 
Remittances  --- 0.005 --- 0.015*** 
  (0.463)  (0.007) 
Financial Stability  --- 0.014*** --- 0.010** 
  (0.004)  (0.040) 
     
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Net Effects  0.1090 na na na 
Thresholds  61.875 na na na 
AR(1) (0.091) (0.093) (0.113) (0.095) 
AR(2) (0.341) (0.332) (0.712) (0.390) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.144) (0.449) (0.359) (0.276) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group --- (0.279) --- (0.315) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.297) (0.516) (0.893) (0.287) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group --- (0.178) --- (0.195) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- (0.701) --- (0.412) 
     
Fisher  5342.58*** 2385.30*** 149.07*** 102361.1*** 
Instruments  20 32 20 32 
Countries  41 38 39 36 
Observations  409 325 389 307 
     
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and 
the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. FLFpart: Female Labour Force Participation. FE: Female Employment. 130.03, 113.19 are mean 
values for respectively, female labor force participation, and female employment. Constants are included in the regressions. Constants are 
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included in the regressions. n.a: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not 
significant.  
 
 
In order to investigate the overall effect of enhancing gender inclusion on inequality, net effects 
are computed, in accordance with the contemporary literature on interactive regressions (Asongu 
& Odhiambo, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019). For example, in the penultimate column of Table 
1, the net impact on the Gini index from the enhancement of female employment is 
0.010(2×[0.00009 × 113.19] + [-0.010]).  In this calculation, the average value of female 
employment is 113.19, the marginal impact of female employment is 0.00009, the unconditional 
effect of female employment is -0.010 and the leading 2 is from the quadratic derivation.  
               The following findings can be established from Tables 1-3. (i) There is a positive net 
effect from the enhancement of female employment on the Gini coefficient. (ii) There are 
positive net effects from the improvement of female labor participation and female employment 
on the Atkinson index. (iii) A positive net effect is apparent from the enhancement of female 
labor participation on the Palma ratio. The control variables have the expected signs.   
 
3.2 Discussion and extension with policy thresholds  
 The established positive net effects are unexpected because we anticipated that enhancing 
gender inclusion will reduce inequality. From the findings, while the unconditional effects of 
gender inclusion are consistently negative, the conditional or marginal effects are consistently 
positive. This is an indication that while gender inclusion does reduce inequality, enhancing 
gender inclusion increases inequality. This may be traceable to the fact that the additional 
women involved in the formal economic sector make a transition to the wealthier fraction of the 
population or are already from the wealthier fraction of the population. It follows that enhancing 
gender inclusion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the reduction of inequality. This 
motivates the computation of thresholds at which further enhancing gender inclusion increases 
inequality. These thresholds are worthwhile for policy because beyond the critical masses, 
further enhancement of gender inclusion should be complemented with alternative measures 
destined to mitigate the incremental inequality associated with the further enhancement of 
gender inclusion.  
 In the light of these clarifications, in the penultimate column of Table 1, a threshold of  
55.555 (0.010/ [2×0.00009]) “employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%)” is the critical 
mass at which the net effect of enhancing female employment on the Gini coefficient is 0 
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(2×[0.00009× 55.555] + [-0.010]). Hence above the established threshold of 55.555, further 
increasing female employment will increase inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient). It follows that 
above this threshold, policies should be designed to involve women from poorer fractions of 
society into the formal economic sector.  
 The corresponding positive thresholds in Table 2 are: (i) 50 “labor force participation 
rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)” and (ii) between 50 to 55 “employment to 
population ratio, 15+, female (%)”, for the Atkinson index. Moreover, in Table 3,61.87 is the 
threshold of “labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+)” for the 
Palma ratio. The computed thresholds have economic relevance and make economic sense 
because they fall within the policy ranges disclosed in the summary statistics (i.e. between the 
minimum and maximum values).  
 Before concluding this paper, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the underlying 
conception of threshold is consistent with the attendant critical mass literature, notably: 
thresholds upon which growing environmental degradation has a negative incidence on inclusive 
development (Asongu, 2018); initial conditions for rewarding effects (Cummins, 2000); critical 
masses for favourable effects (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015)and inflexion points at 
which information sharing reduces market power for the enhancement of financial access 
(Asongu, le Roux, Tchamyou, 2019). 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions  
This study investigates how enhancing gender inclusion affects inequality in 42 African 
countries for the period 2004-2014. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalized Method 
of Moments. Three inequality indicators are used, namely, the: Gini coefficient, Atkinson index 
and Palma ratio. Two gender inclusion measurements are employed: female labor force 
participation and female employment. The following main findings are established. There are 
positive net effects on inequality from the enhancement of gender inclusion.  
An extended threshold analysis is used to assess critical masses at which further 
increasing gender inclusion enhances inequality. Accordingly, from the findings, while the 
unconditional effects of gender inclusion are consistently negative, the conditional or marginal 
effects are consistently positive. This may be traceable to the fact that the additional women 
involved in the formal economic sector make a transition to the wealthier fraction of the 
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population or are already in the wealthier fraction of the population. It follows that enhancing 
gender inclusion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the reduction of inequality. This 
has motivated the computation of thresholds at which further enhancing gender inclusion 
increases inequality.  
The thresholds are: (i) 55.555 “employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%)” as the 
critical mass for the Gini coefficient. (ii) 50 “labor force participation rate, female (% of female 
population ages 15+)” and between 50 to 55 “employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%)”, 
for the Atkinson index. (iii) 61.87 “labor force participation rate, female (% of female population 
ages 15+)” for the Palma ratio. The computed thresholds have economic relevance and make 
economic sense because they fall within the policy ranges disclosed in the summary statistics 
(i.e. between the minimum and maximum values).  
These established thresholds are worthwhile for policy because beyond the critical 
masses, further enhancement of gender inclusion should be associated with complementary 
measures destined to mitigate the incremental inequality. Future research should focus on 
country-specific cases in order to provide country-specific policy implications. This 
recommendation is motivated by the fact that country-specific effects are not involved in the 
GMM because of the need to avoid endogeneity resulting from the correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and country-specific effects.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
 
 
Income Inequality  
Gini 
Coefficient  
“The Gini coefficient is a measurement of the income 
distribution of a country's residents”. 
GCIP 
   
Atkinson 
Index 
“The Atkinson index measures inequality by 
determining which end of the distribution contributed 
most to the observed inequality”. 
GCIP 
   
Palma Ratio “The Palma ratio is defined as the ratio of the richest 
10% of the population's share of gross national income 
divided by the poorest 40%'s share”. 
GCIP 
    
Female economic 
participation   
FLFpart Labor force participation rate, female (% of female 
population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
    
Female 
Employment  
FE Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) 
(modeled ILO estimate) 
ILO 
    
 
 
Political Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism” 
 
WGI 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
    
Financial Stability  Z-score Prediction of the likelihood that a bank might 
survive and not go bankrupt. 
FDSD 
    
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database of 
the World Bank. WGI: World Governance Indicators. ILO: International Labour Organization.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Gini Index   0.586 0.034 0.488 0.851 461 
Atkinson Index  0.705 0.058 0.509 0.834 461 
Palma Ratio  6.457 1.477 3.015 14.434 461 
Female Labor Force participation  130.03 83.996 1.000 287.00 462 
Female Employment  113.19 69.850 1.000 256.00 462 
Political Stability  -0.471 0.905 -2.687 1.182 462 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
Financial Stability  8.713 4.994 -12.024 25.736 404 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 364) 
          
Inequality  Female participation  Control variables  
Gini Atkinson Palma FLFpart FE PolS Remit Z-score  
1.000 0.797 0.931 0.109 0.076 0.290 -0.014 0.135 Gini 
 1.000 0.918 0.041 -0.012 0.315 0.216 -0.006 Atkinson 
  1.000 0.062 0.018 0.357 0.115 0.091 Palma 
   1.000 0.656 0.025 0.024 -0.181 FLFpart 
    1.000 -0.134 0.087 -0.090 FE 
     1.000 0.061 0.108 PolS 
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      1.000 -0.099 Remit 
       1.000 Z-score 
          
Gini: the Gini Index. Atkinson: the Atkinson Index. Palma: the Palma Ratio. FLFpart: Female Labour Force Participation. FU: 
Female Unemployment. FE: Female Employment. PolS: Political stability. Remit: Remittances. Z-score: Financial Stability.  
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